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Abstract: This article examines the effect of participatory governance on policy
performance in the United States, which is shaped by external and internal factors
related to transaction cost. Externally, if transaction-cost-related policy conditions
are uncertain—thereby increasing transaction cost—the effect of participatory
governance on policy performance is less positive. Internally, noninstitutionalized
participatory governance methods (e.g., public meetings) are less effective than
institutionalized ones in improving policy performance (e.g., advisory committees).
In addition, these internal and external factors affect the choice of participatory
governance methods by government agencies: agencies are more likely to employ
institutionalized participatory governance methods under low-transaction-cost
policy conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
For several decades, participatory governance arguments have been prevalent in
public administration studies (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Participatory governance is defined
as “the institutional arrangements that allow the public to take part in deliberation,
negotiation, and administrative decision making about public affairs” (Andersson and
van Laerhoven, 2007). In this article, the concept is related to collaboration between
agencies and nonstate policy stakeholders in the policy making stage rather than to
coproduction with social actors in the implementation stage. Because scientific and
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time and place information is an important resource in making public policies, collab-
orative efforts to accumulate policy information is critical for effective administration
(Imperial, 2005; Eom & Bae, 2014). In addition, close interactions with social policy
stakeholders make agencies more responsive (Leach, 2006) and maximize informa-
tional benefits (Sousa & Klyza, 2007). Many studies on participatory governance have
accentuated the positive effects of such interactions on policy performance (Paletta,
2012). For example, Neshkova & Guo (2012) illustrate that U.S. state transportation
agencies could acquire detailed site-specific information through participatory gover-
nance, thereby improving policy performance. Likewise, Nicholson-Crotty & O’Toole
(2004) show that U.S. municipal police departments could gain a better understanding
of policy environments (e.g., arrest rates) through participatory governance and so
enhance their policy performance.
Participatory governance is not a panacea that uniformly improves policy performance
in all conditions (Doberstein, 2016; Gerlak, Heikkila, & Lubell, 2012; Choi, 2014).
Rather, the effect of participatory governance may vary depending on policy conditions
or participation methods (Frieling, Lindenberg, & Stokman., 2014; Robertson & Choi,
2012). For example, participatory governance is considered to be especially successful
in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Gerlak et al., 2012), and several
studies have argued that its participatory governance efforts such as negotiated rule-
making enhance the flow of information, thereby promoting policy performance (e.g.,
Lubell, 2000). However, evaluations of the agency’s policy performance have not always
been positive. Several other studies claim that several EPA participatory governance
programs such as Project XL have failed to improve policy performance (e.g., Marcus,
Geffen, & Sexton, 2002). In addition, according to the Program Assessment Rating
Tool (PART) developed by the Office of Management and Budget during the George
W. Bush presidency to measure policy performance, no environmental program imple-
mented by EPA was evaluated as “Effective.”
These inconsistent study results imply that participatory governance may not be
linearly related to policy performance. In this article, I propose that the relative benefits
of participatory governance vary depending on internal and external factors that are
related to the transaction cost incurred during the interaction between agencies and
social policy stakeholders. I run several regression tests that indicate that uncertain
policy conditions that increase the transaction cost limit the positive effect of participa-
tory governance on policy performance and that the positive effect is robust only when
institutionalized participatory governance methods are used.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES: 
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND TRANSACTION COST
According to Williamson (1985), efficient forms of governance can be determined
by transaction cost. In particular, transaction cost economics (TCE) studies have
argued that participatory governance is more appropriate for low transaction costs,
whereas hierarchical governance structures are appropriate for high transaction costs
(Williamson, 1991, 1996). Therefore, a participatory system is not efficient if the cost
of transactions with stakeholders is high.
Transaction cost analysis has been applied extensively to government contracting
in the policy implementation stage, particularly to alternative service production
arrangements such as internal production, partnerships, contracting out, subsidies, and
franchises (Tang & Mazmanian, 2010). For example, Brown and Potoski (2003) argue
that government contracting mechanisms are likely to be determined by transaction
cost. Likewise, Reeves (2008) analyzes the practice of contracting in public-private
partnerships in terms of transaction cost. However, transaction cost has not been suffi-
ciently examined in terms of stakeholder participation in agency policy making. Rather,
many recent public administration studies in support of participatory governance have
generally assumed that participatory governance in the policy making stage (e.g., in
advisory committees, negotiated rulemakings, and dispute resolution processes) is
almost always positive without sufficiently examining transaction cost environments.
In this vein, myriad studies have emphasized participatory policy making as a response
to adversarial administration (Singleton, 2002; Innes & Booher, 1999; Freeman, 1997;
Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; Gunningham, 2009; Kelly, 2004) and have argued that
dialogues beyond organizational boundaries are necessary to resolve conflicts and 
perform efficiently (Harter, 1982; Harmon, 1995; Roberts, 2002). Mee (1997), for
instance, shows that the EPA’s engaging in regulatory negotiations generated coopera-
tion among stakeholders and resolved rulemaking stalemates in the combined sewer
outflows regulation. In other words, participatory governance studies have generally
applauded open structures within agencies and public participation without serious
consideration of transaction cost.
Nevertheless, diverse transaction problems can arise when nonstate stakeholders
take part during the policy making stage, undermining policy performance (Ansell,
2011). Individual nonstate policy stakeholders have their own policy preferences that
may conflict with others’ goals. Thus, they frequently provide biased information 
and interrupt policy making processes, thereby inevitably increasing transaction cost.
Even though the participatory governance methods used by the EPA, for instance,
have generally been beneficial (Langbein & Kerwin, 2000), they have at times caused
Designed to Succeed 3
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
significant inefficiency, in particular when the interests of nonstate stakeholders have
conflicted, thereby increasing transaction cost. In an environmental dispute resolution
conference, EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus said that more than 80% of the
EPA’s rules had been challenged and that these judicial challenges seriously compro-
mised policy performance (Susskind & McMahon, 1985).
Likewise, significant oversight on the part of elected officials that can easily affect
agency decisions also increases transaction cost by promoting uncertainty in adminis-
tration (Lee, 2013). For example, in the early 1980s, the U.S. Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) initiated a process to amend the 7-7-7 rule, which had been enacted
in 1953, under which a media organization could own up to seven television stations,
seven FM radio stations, and seven AM radio stations. However, severe congressional
oversight delayed the FCC’s rulemaking, and nonstate policy stakeholders lost trust in
agency proposals and became reluctant to express their opinions and ideas. Consequently,
it took several years for FCC to amend the rule, undermining the policy performance
of the agency.
Traditional participatory governance studies do not completely ignore transaction cost.
Rather, they assert that “fruitful conflict” between agencies and nonstate stakeholders
will result in collaboration, thereby advancing understanding between different interests
(Ansell, 2011). Nevertheless, these studies do not sufficiently discuss or empirically
examine what makes “fruitful conflict” possible and what is impact is on transaction
cost. This study posits several hypotheses based on TCE and participatory governance
arguments. First, as a number of participatory governance studies have pointed out,
participatory governance tends to have positive effects on policy performance. How-
ever, externally, the effect of participatory governance on policy performance will vary
depending on transaction-cost-related policy conditions. Uncertain environmental and
behavioral conditions that lead to higher transaction costs will limit the positive effect
of participatory governance. Internally, the institutional embeddedness of interactive
relationships improves the mutual trust between agencies and social policy stakeholders,
thereby limiting the negative effect of transaction costs (Warner, 2006; Willem &
Lucidarme, 2014). Thus, the effect of noninstitutionalized participatory governance on
policy performance might be less positive than that of institutionalized participatory
governance even under low-transaction-cost policy conditions.
In addition, if internal and external factors determine the effect of participatory
governance, agencies could manage their own participatory governance methods by
considering these factors. TCE studies have argued that rational actors would determine
their form of governance in accordance with transaction costs. Thus, if agencies are
neutrally rational decision makers, they would be more likely to devote more resources
to institutionalized participatory governance methods such as advisory committees
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under low-transaction-cost policy conditions. And because the effect of noninstitution-
alized participatory governance methods such as public meetings might be vulnerable
even under low-transaction-cost policy conditions, agencies would have less incentive
to consider using those methods. Moreover, as Moe (1990) points out, not only trans-
action cost but also political environments affect agencies’ governance designs. In par-
ticular, the effect of political environments is greater for noninstitutionalized participa-
tory governance methods because institutionalization insulates policy from politics,
which makes it difficult for outside actors to affect them (Chubb & Peterson, 1985). In
sum, transaction-cost-related policy conditions rather than political environments
might be more meaningful for institutionalized participatory governance. In contrast,
political environments rather than transaction-cost-related policy conditions may be
more significant in determining which noninstitutionalized participatory governance
methods are used.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND DISCUSSION: 
THE EFFECT OF PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE
For statistical evaluation of the hypotheses, data on 27 U.S. federal regulatory
agencies were used for regression tests (see appendix 1). To make the samples uniform
and prevent possible biases from agency-specific characteristics, only the largest domestic
regulatory federal agencies (i.e., the agencies that have more than one thousand
employees and more than three hundred Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] pages in
the 2000s) were included in the dataset. Large agencies enjoy the positive effects of




There have been several attempts to measure policy performance in the United
States, despite the fact that making such assessments is difficult owing to the highly
heterogeneous nature of agency operations. For example, the Merit Principles Survey
(MPS) performed by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board covers a variety of 
performance issues including work environment, employee knowledge, and advisory
services. Several studies have used MPS to measure organizational performance in
U.S. federal agencies (e.g., Brewer & Selden, 2000). However, the MPS measures are
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based on self-assessment. Therefore they are inevitably biased, and the neutrality
problem is significant (Meier & O’Toole, 2013). The Federal Performance Project
(FPP) conducted in the later 1990s and early 2000s evaluated policy performances of
U.S. federal agencies in a more neutral manner, based on several criteria such as 
managers’ use of agency resources and maintenance of physical infrastructures and
how well they communicate. However, the applicability of the measure was limited;
only 27 agencies’ performances were measured in 1999, 2000, and 2001.
In comparison with MPS and FPP, PART is less problematic. The instrument 
consisted of four categories: program purpose and design, strategic planning, program
management, and program results. Individual programs were given a numerical score
that aligned with a categorical scale of performance ranging from effective (85-100),
moderately effective (70-84), adequate (50-69) to ineffective (0-49). Many administrative
programs were evaluated with PART in an effort on the part of the Bush admiration to
promote it. Thus, many administrative studies likewise adopted PART as a measure of
policy performance (e.g., Gallo & Lewis, 2012). Several studies have considered the
question of the neutrality of the measure, concluding that it tended to be highly neutral
(e.g., Moynihan, 2013; Dull, 2006), and so in this study, I have used average PART
evaluations of individual agencies as the measure of policy performance. The data
were derived from ExpectMore.gov.
Participatory Governance
As defined in the introduction section, the inclusion of nonstate policy stakeholders
in the policy making stage is a core part of participatory governance. In the United
States, there are two main tools of participatory governance: advisory committees and
public meetings.1 Historically, the advisory committee is a dominant participatory
governance method among US federal agencies.2 There are more than 1,000 advisory
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1. Admittedly, there are other nonstate stakeholders participation methods such as the
ombudsman and negotiated rulemaking. However, although negotiated rulemaking was
historically one of the most important methods U.S. federal agencies in improving non-
state stakeholders’ participation, only few agencies have used the method since the mid-
1990s (Coglianese, 1997; Lubbers, 2008). Ombudsmen have been used by many U.S. fed-
eral agencies and continue to be widely used todays, but they cannot overturn a federal
agency’s decision or delay its implementation, and, in reality, they have played no more
than a symbolic role (Shapiro, 2007).
2. In this study, I have considered all types of advisory committees regardless of level of authority
and committee functions, because advisory committees in general promote collaboration with
nonstate stakeholders. However, I excluded advisory committees that have never convened 
committees operated by US federal agencies currently. The qualities of individual
advisory committees tend to be consistent because the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (P.L. 92-463, FACA) provides broad guidelines for committee management. For
example, the act requires that all federal advisory committees be “fairly balanced in
terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed.” Through
advisory committees, social policy stakeholders come up with creative solutions to
problems by negotiating regulations and adjusting agency proposals in transparent
meetings (Bingham, 2010; Applegate, 1998; Balla, 2004). In the 1980s, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), for example, suffered from serious conflicts and
found itself in a rulemaking stalemate in regulating flight times, duty time, and rest
period for flight crewmembers. The FAA established the Regulatory Negotiation
Advisory Committee to tackle these administrative problems and was successful in
resolving them (Gormley & Balla, 2004). Because PART data are cross-sectional during
the George W. Bush administration, this study uses the average advisory committee
spending (during FY2001–FY2008) divided by the average budget authority in order
to neutralize the effect of agency size. All budget and spending data were revised to be
constant in 2008 dollars.
The public meeting is also a popular participatory governance method (Adams,
2004; Wang & Wart, 2007). However, advisory committees are likely to last for several
years without significant member changes, and thus are highly institutionalized in 
policy communities, whereas the relationship between agencies and social policy
stakeholders in public meetings is instant and temporary. Even though this characteristic
of public meetings helps keep management costs down, they are not well institutionalized
(McComas, 2001). Thus, it can be inferred that the effect of public meetings may be
limited under high-transaction-cost policy conditions compared with advisory committees.
In measuring this variable, I included public hearings, workshops, and open houses
given that the all these types of meetings are open to the public.3 However, I excluded
simple informational meetings because these are intended only to provide administrative
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or that are not active, because inactive advisory committees are meaningless as participatory
governance. Because agencies tend to employ different types of advisory committees,
excluding some types of advisory committees can underestimate the variable. For example,
while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission tends to use scientific technical program advisory
boards, the Small Business Administration has generally used national policy issues advisory
boards.
3. Individual agencies tend to depend on different types of public meetings. For example, the
Minerals Management Service has generally employed public hearings, while the Forest
Service relies on open houses. Thus, excluding specific types of public meetings could
underestimate the frequency of public meetings in specific agencies.
information to the public rather than promote participation. To avoid the biased effect
of agency size, the number of public meetings was divided by budget authority (in
2008 billion dollars).
Transaction-Cost-Related Policy Conditions
Transaction cost is highly contingent on environmental conditions and participant
behaviors (Williamson, 1996), and so it will tend to increase in environmentally and
behaviorally uncertain policy conditions (John & Weitz, 1988; Rangan, Corey, & 
Cespedes, 1993).4 Environmental uncertainty refers to the changeability and complexity
of policy environments. When elected officials are able to easily overturn agency deci-
sions or when policy issues are too complex to be comprehensively understood, the
interactions between agencies and social policy stakeholders may become uncertain,
thereby increasing transaction cost. To measure environmental uncertainty, this study used
the number of congressional hearings in which individual federal agencies participated
and the number of Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports on specific agen-
cies as witnesses. These measures generally imply changeable and complex policy
environments (Wolfe, 2012). Congressional hearings and GAO investigations into
agencies’ activities increase the possibility that agency decisions may be reversed by
elected officials (Cameron & Rosendorff, 1993), thereby providing new opportunities
for social policy stakeholders to engage in policy making or threatening the contribu-
tions they have already made (Paulson, 2004). Congressional hearings and GAO
investigations are costly for legislators, and so they are reluctant to use these them
(Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999). Thus, frequent congressional oversight generally indi-
cates that legislators have a high incentive to overturn agency decisions (Aberbach,
1990; Jones et al., 2014). Policy stakeholders cannot have sufficient trust in agency
proposals if these proposals are hounded by congressional hearings or GAO investiga-
tions. These measures also reflect the complexity of policy environments. Legislators
tend to hold congressional hearings or ask GAO to investigate agency decisions
regarding highly complex issues (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999). In this regard, these
two measures can represent environmental uncertainty as transaction-cost-related policy
conditions.
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4. Theoretically, Oliver Williamson emphasizes not only uncertainty but also asset specificity.
In this article, however, asset specificity that refers to sunk costs that have little value outside
of specific transactions are not measured as a transaction-cost-related policy condition, since
environmental uncertainty is an antecedent of asset specificity, and these two are correlated
and sequential rather than independent (Rangan et al., 1993).
Behavioral uncertainty refers to the uncertainty related to the risk of participant
opportunism (Williamson, 1985). If policy demands are heterogeneous, conflicts are
more likely among social policy stakeholders, which may make them more likely to
provide agencies with biased information (Osborne et al., 2000; Pizzo, 2013). Thus,
competitive participation among multiple social policy stakeholders inflates transaction
cost (Robertson & Choi, 2012; Lee, 2013). Lobbying in particular has a significant
impact on transaction cost during the policy enactment stage (e.g., McCann, Colby,
Easter, Kasterine, & Kuperan, 2005). Because interest group lobbies represent hetero-
geneous policy demands in agency policy making, this study used the frequency of
lobbies on individual agencies as a measure for behavioral uncertainty. For the mea-
sure, the data of the Center for Responsive Politics were used, although owing to the
database’s limitations, the frequency of lobbies for 5 out of the selected 27 agencies
(Agricultural Marketing Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Food and
Nutrition Service, Farm Service Agency, and Food Safety and Inspection Service) could
not be measured. In addition, the heterogeneity of policy demands and competitive
participation tend to increase as policy issues become salient (Haider-Markel & Meier,
1996; Gormley, 1986). Thus, for issue salience, the number of New York Times articles
that cite agency behaviors was also measured.
Other Variables
Several other variables such as budgetary authority and a dummy variable of inde-
pendent agencies were also included in this study as controls. Budgetary authority
indicates the authority provided by law to a federal agency to spend money for certain
purposes. This variable was inserted to control for the effect from economy of scale.
Likewise, independent agencies tend to be more autonomous than nonindependent
ones in making public policies, which may affect policy performance. In addition, if
policy issues are highly salient, agencies are more likely to feel pressure to enhance
policy performance. The size of the budget authority was revised to be constant in 
billions of 2008 dollars to adjust for inflation. In addition, the average values of variables
between FY2001 and FY2008 were generally used.
Regression Test 1: 
Transaction Cost and the Effect of Participatory Governance
Because this study selected only 27 U.S. federal agencies to make the samples 
uniform, a small sample size problem is possible. To prevent this problem, I check the
normality of the dependent variable and use multiple regression models to reduce the
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number of independent variables. Even when the sample size is small, if the data of the
dependent variable is normally distributed, the sample means of the variable should also
be normally distributed, thereby limiting the small sample size problem. The normality
of the dependent variable (i.e., PART for policy performance) is demonstrated by
Shapiro-Wilk W test (W=.964, z=.106, p-value=.458) and Shapiro-Francia W’ test
(W’=.959, z=.539, p-value=.295), in which p-value>.05 indicates normal distribution.
In addition, in order to reduce the number of independent variables, I have run multiple
models depending on the different measures of transaction-cost-related policy conditions
(i.e., lobbying, issue salience, hearings, and GAO investigations).
Tables 2 and 3 show the regression test results on the effects of advisory committees
and public meetings on policy performance. Both tables generally support the hypotheses
that participatory governance tends to have positive effects on policy performance and
that uncertain environmental and behavioral conditions yield higher transaction costs
that limit the positive effect of participatory governance. Table 2 indicates that more
advisory committee spending promoted policy performance. However, the coefficients
of the interactive variables between transaction-cost-related policy conditions and
advisory committee spending are negative, which implies that the effect of participatory
governance decreases as transaction cost increases. For all measures of transaction-
cost-related policy conditions (i.e., lobbying, issue salience, hearings, and GAO inves-
tigations), the statistical results are consistent. Likewise, table 3 shows that the effect
directions of public meetings are similar to those of advisory committees, even though
the negative effects of the two interactive variables (in terms of issue salience and
hearings) are not statistically significant. In other words, similar to advisory committees,
the positive effect of public meetings on policy performance tends to decrease as
transaction cost increases.
In addition, the hypothesis that that the positive effect of institutionalized participa-
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Measures Mean SD Max.
policy performance PART 69.73 8.51 90.29
participatory governance
advisory committee spending 0.05 0.12 .576
public meeting 40.86 159.54 832.31
lobbying 134.59 171.88 715
transaction-cost-related issue salience 130.45 243.61 1102.13
policy conditions hearings 4.78 4.51 16.5
GAO investigations 5.73 8.14 43.625 
tory governance is more robust than that of noninstitutionalized participatory gover-
nance is also supported by comparing tables 2 and 3. Given the average values of four
different transaction-cost-related policy conditions (see table 1), the effect of advisory
committee spending was highly positive. Given the average values of lobbying, issue
salience, hearings, and GAO investigations, the coefficients of advisory committee
spending are 36.18, 17.35, 40.13, and 30.45, which implies that advisory committees
are almost always meaningful in promoting policy performance, even though their
effects decrease depending on transaction-cost-related policy conditions. In contrast,
public meetings may negatively affect policy performance even under low-transaction-
cost policy conditions. Given the average values of lobbying and GAO investigations,
the coefficients of the public meeting becomes negative; -.016 and -.005 for lobby and
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Table 2. Effect of Advisory Committee Spending on Policy Performance
Dependent Variable
Policy Performance
model 1-1 model 1-2 model 1-3 model 1-4
advisory committee spending 50.448* 34.572
† 65.578† 38.713*
(24.516) (24.213) (41.650) (21.537)
lobbying (mean = 134.59) -.106**
× advisory committee spending (.036)
issue salience (mean = 130.45) -.132*
× advisory committee spending (.060)
hearings (mean = 4.78) -5.324*
× advisory committee spending (2.703)
GAO investigations (mean = 5.73) -1.442**
× advisory committee spending (.004)
issue salience .019*** .008 .015*** .017***(.004) (.006) (.004) (.004)
independent agency 7.200
† 6.310† 6.943† 6.620†
(4.404) (4.437) (4.302) (4.378)
budget authority .013** .012** .013** .013**(.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
constant 63.585*** 65.376*** 64.446*** 64.499***(2.18) (1.694) (1.699) (1.696)
prob > F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
R2 .526 .460 .486 .485
N . 22 . 27 . 27 . 27
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. † significant at .10 level, * significant at .05 level, **significant at
.01 level, ***significant at .001 level (one-tailed).
GAO investigations. From the contrasting regression results, it can be inferred that the
public meeting as a noninstitutionalized participatory governance method is ineffec-
tive even under low-transaction-cost policy conditions.
Regression Test 2: Management of Participatory Governance
In testing the hypothesis that transaction-cost-related policy conditions rather than
political environments might be more meaningful for institutionalized participatory
governance and that political environments rather than transaction-cost-related policy
conditions may be more significant in determining which noninstitutionalized participa-
tory governance methods are used, I have used advisory committee spending (measured
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Table 3. Effect of the Public Meeting on Policy Performance
Dependent Variable
Policy Performance
model 2-1 model 2-2 model 2-3 model 2-4
public meeting .038*** .031** .050† .058***
(.009) (.009) (.035) (.006)
lobbying (mean = 134.59) -.0004†
× public meeting (.000)
issue salience (mean = 130.45) -.000
× public meeting (.000)
hearings (mean = 4.78) -.009
× public meeting (.012)
GAO investigations (mean = 5.73) -.011***
× public meeting (.002)
issue salience .019*** .017*** .016*** .016***
(.004) (.032) (.004) (.003)
independent agency 1.215 1.010 1.723 2.994
(3.054) (3.376) (2.508) (2.294)
budget authority .014*** .015*** .014*** .013***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
constant 65.527*** 65.380*** 65.638*** 65.614***
(2.281) (1.751) (1.856) (1.761)
prob > F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
R2 .581 .535 .567 .582
N . 22 . 27 . 27 . 27
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. † significant at .10 level, * significant at .05 level, **significant at
.01 level, ***significant at .001 level (one-tailed).
in 2008 thousand dollars) and the numbers of public meetings as dependent variables.
For the dependent variables, I collected the annual data for the selected agencies over
the eight years of the George W. Bush presidency (i.e., FY2001-FY2008) and ran panel
regressions. To prevent autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems that are generally
derived from panel regressions, fixed effects regressions with AR(1) disturbances were
employed.
For independent variables, four transaction-cost-related policy conditions (i.e.,
lobby, issue salience, hearings, and GAO investigations) have been included as well as
several political environment variables—executive-legislative conflict, unified govern-
ment, and a liberalism score. When the political environment is favorable for agencies,
they can acquire sufficient procedural justice through participatory governance without
political risks. But when the political environment is unfavorable, agencies could end
up providing their political opponents with the opportunity to criticize and overturn
agency decisions. Therefore, agencies are more likely to employ participatory gover-
nance methods when the political environment are favorable—that is, when ideological
conflict between the executive and legislative branch is minimal or when the public
generally supports agency decisions ideologically. To measure the extent of executive-
legislative conflict, the ideological difference between President Bush and the median
number of members of U.S. Congress was calculated based on the first-dimension
DW-NOMINATE scores.5 For convenience, this measure was multiplied by a thousand.
Likewise, agencies are more likely to use participatory governance methods in the
context of a unified government, and so a dummy variable of unified government has
been inserted into regression models. Similarly, when the public mood is ideologically
supportive of the president, agencies will be more open to social policy stakeholders.
For this variable, the public policy mood, a time-series measure of the liberalism level
of the public developed by James A. Stimson, has been used.6
The amount of agency resources and the extent of regulation can also affect the
availability of participatory governance methods. Therefore, budget authority (in 2008
billion dollars) and the number of CFR pages that represent the number of regulations
an agency has have been included as controls. In addition, a dummy variable of inde-
pendent agencies is also included, because independent agencies can manage partic-
ipatory governance methods more autonomously.
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5. The DW-NOMINATE score, developed and measured by several scholars such as Keith
Poole, Howard Rosenthal, and Nolan McCarty, is the most widely used measure for the
political ideologies of elected officials. The data of DW-NOMINATE come from voteview.
com.
6. The data pertaining to public policy mood come from http://stimson.web.unc.edu/data.
The statistical results reported table 4 imply that transaction cost might be an
important factor affecting participatory governance management, particularly regarding
advisory committees. Generally, when transaction cost increases in terms of lobbying,
issue salience, and hearings, agencies are less likely to increase advisory committee
spending. In contrast, in models 3-2 and 3-3, political environment variables are 
generally insignificant. It can be concluded that agency decisions in the management
of advisory committees are much more dependent on transaction cost than the nature
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Table 4. Factors Affecting the Management of Participatory Governance Methods
Dependent Variables
Advisory Committee Spending Public Meeting
Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3 Model 4-1 Model 4-2 Model 4-3
lobbying -.656* -.673
† -.655† -.061 -.045 -.053
(.403) (.410) (.406) (.050) (.050) (.049)
issue salience -.268* -.261
† -.264* .003 -.007 -.008
(.156) (.158) (.159) (.018) (.018) (.018)
hearings -6.696* -6.929* -6.636* .543 .719
† .782*
(3.654) (3.847) (3.906) (.426) (.434) (.438)
GAO investigations -3.654 -3.800 -3.869 -.497 -.421 -.397(4.800) (4.849) (4.847) (.595) (.589) (.588)
independent agency 175.670 183.333 183.161 12.828 4.017 5.467(272.92) (277.322) (277.60) (29.398) (28.247) (28.092)
CFR pages -.244*** -.248*** -.245*** .002 .007 .007(.060) (.062) (.063) (.006) (.006) (.005)
budget authority .624 .580 .580 .006 .038 .046(.923) (.940) (.943) (.090) (.086) (.085)
executive-legislative .300 -.178*
conflict (.920) (.100)
unified government -2.354 9.647*(44.107) (4.863)
liberalism score 4.658 4.088 -3.339** -2.232
†
(15.106) (15.242) (1.34) (1.468)
constant 997.73*** 487.931 752.952
† 43.745*** 375.018*** 158.896*
(97.948) (643.233) (496.854) (13.410) (80.166) (68.977)
prob>F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
N . 154 . 154 . 154 . 154 . 154 . 154
Fixed effects regressions with AR(1) disturbances are employed.
Standard errors are in parentheses, † significant at .10 level, * significant at .05 level, **significant at .01 level,
***significant at .001 level (one-tailed).
of the political environment. In contrast, model 4-1 shows that the effects of transaction-
cost-related policy conditions are statistically insignificant regarding the frequency of
public meetings. Because the effect of public meetings are vulnerable even under low-
transaction-cost policy conditions, it can be concluded that transaction-cost-related
policy conditions do not determine whether public meetings are held or not. However,
models 4-2 and 4-3 indicate that executive-legislative conflict, the existence of a unified
government, and the liberalism score are statistically significant for public meetings.
When a conservative public mood prevails or when executive-legislative is insignificant
(i.e., limited ideological difference between the president and the median legislator or
unified government), agencies are more likely to hold public meetings. These results
were opposite of those of advisory committees in models 3-2 and 3-3, implying that the
extent to which participatory governance methods are deployed, particularly noninsti-
tutionalized ones, depends on the political environment.7
CONCLUSION
This study examines what role internal and external factors related with transaction
cost play in effect of participatory governance on policy performance. Even though
participatory governance have been applauded in myriad studies, its effect is not always
positive, and agencies never employ its methods unconditionally (Rigg & O’Mahony,
2013; Robertson & Choi, 2012). The several regression tests I conducted generally
support the basic assumptions of participatory governance; both advisory committees
and public meetings have positive effects on policy performance. However, depending
on transaction-cost-related policy conditions and the level of institutionalization of
participatory governance methods, the effect of participatory governance varies. Basi-
cally, the positive effect of participatory governance is limited under high-transaction-
cost policy conditions. When transaction cost increases, agencies need to spend more
time and human resources on the interaction with social policy stakeholders, thereby
wasting administrative resources. Thus, even though agencies may be able to secure
policy information from social policy stakeholders using participatory governance
methods, the effect of participatory governance on policy performance may be negative
under high-transaction-cost policy conditions. In addition, the effect is also dependent
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7. For statistical robustness, I reexamined the models of public meetings (i.e., models 4-1, 4-2,
and 4-3) using by count models such as panel negative binomial regressions and panel
Poisson regressions with fixed effects. However, the basic results were similar regarding
all four transaction-cost-related policy conditions.
on the level of institutionalization of participatory governance methods. When participa-
tory governance is institutionalized in policy communities, thereby increasing mutual
trust between agencies and social policy stakeholders, the negative effect of transaction
cost is more likely to be limited. In other words, the effect of institutionalized participa-
tory governance method tends to be robust even under high-transaction-cost policy
conditions. For example, advisory committees are generally maintained for several
years, and the relationship between committee members and agency bureaucrats is
very close. Institutionalized participatory governance methods enhance mutual trust,
which limits the negative effect of transaction cost. In contrast, the effect of public
meetings as a noninstitutionalized participatory governance method is highly vulnerable
even under low-transaction-cost policy conditions.
These internal and external factors that are related to transaction cost also affect the
management of participatory governance methods. Agencies tend to spend more on
advisory committees as transaction cost decreases. In contrast, the political environment
is less meaningful with respect to advisory committee spending. Because advisory
committees tend to be institutionalized in policy communities, the management of the
method would be insulated from political environments. On the other hand, transaction-
cost-related policy conditions are not important when it comes to whether public meetings
are held or not. As table 3 indicates, the effect of public meetings can be negative even
under low-transaction-cost policy conditions. Thus, agencies have less incentive to
consider transaction-cost-related policy conditions in holding public meetings. Rather,
when political environments are favorable for agencies, they are more likely to hold
public meetings. In other words, regarding the management of public meetings, agencies
tend to consider political environments relative to transaction-cost-related policy con-
ditions, partly because of their noninstitutionalization.
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Appendix 1. U.S. Federal Agencies Analyzed
Agency PART Advisory Committee Spending (2008 dollars)
Agricultural Marketing Service 60 63294
Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives Bureau 68.5 0
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 60 18338.1
Employment and Training Administration 64.25 167738
Environmental Protection Agency 60 4500000
Farm Service Agency 76.5 0
Federal Aviation Administration 64.04 26593.8
Federal Communications Commission 58.1 532319
Federal Emergency Management Agency 76.7 37275
Federal Highway Administration 68.5 0
Fish and Wildlife Service 77 501425
Food and Drug Administration 70.5455 0
Food and Nutrition Service 68.5 0
Food Safety and Inspection Service 71.3333 0
Forest Service 66.8 460502
Health Care Financing Administration 72.375 241231
Indian Affairs Bureau 80.875 0
Land Management Bureau 60 135561
Mine Safety and Health Administration 67.2857 0
Minerals Management Service 90.2857 195832
National Park Service 60 68416.3
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 71.3333 7266.75
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 75.15 41168.8
Patent and Trademark Office 87.3333 0
Securities and Exchange Commission 77 54500.1
Small Business Administration 70.2 165332
Social Security Administration 60 0
Note: The data are average values for the FY2001–FY2008 period.
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